



Flight 11A/STS-113 Flight Readiness Review October 31, 2002



Agenda



Mission/Increment Overview

Kim Ulrich

On-Orbit Vehicle Status

Anthony Sang

• Special Topic

- Ammonia QD Loose Detent Button

Mark Santen

• 11A Flight Summary

Kim Ulrich



Mission Summary



Mission Purpose: Crew Rotation and P1 install

Mission Duration: 11+1+2 Rendezvous Altitude: 211 nmi.

Crew Size: 7 on Orbiter

3 on ISS Station Attitude:

EVAs: 39.0 man-hours (Orbiter crew EVAs)

Initial Flight: XPOP Inertial +XVV, Z Nadir

EVA 1: 6:30

EVA 2: 6:30 Rendezvous: +XVV, Z Nadir

EVA 3: 6:30 Mated: XVV, Z Nadir TEA

Crew

Shuttle Departure: XVV, Z Nadir

• Orbiter CDR – Jim Wetherbee

• PLT - Paul Lockhart

MS1 – Michael Lopez-Alegria (EV1)

MS2 – John Herrington (EV2)

Increment 6 - Arriving

ISS CDR – Kenneth Bowersox

• FE1 – Nikolai Budarin

• FE2 – Don Pettit

Increment 5 - Departing

◆ CDR – Valery Korzun

◆ FE1 – Peggy Whitson

◆ FE2 – Sergei Treschev



International Space Station Program Mission Integration and Operations

ISS-A- 3

OC/Kim Ulrich



Primary Mission Objectives




- Rotate Expedition 5 crew with Expedition 6 crew
- Install P1 truss and complete tasks for P1survival
- Complete 12 hours of crew handover and transfer critical equipment/supplies
- Prepare P1/ISS for the following missions
 - ULF1 (WETA installation/Dummy box return)
 - 12A (Clear MT path, Checkout MT WS 7, Reconfigure MBSU Jumpers, Checkout P1/P3 SSAS))
 - 12A.1 (43 SPDs, NH3/N2 line connection, DLA launch locks)
- Complete Additional handover/transfer
- Reboost ISS, Deploy MEPSI



9A / STS-112 Stage Hardware Overview








11A / STS-113 Stage Hardware Overview

















11A Stage Radiator Deploy











Ascent 6.0 MLE (Includes Packing Factor)

| • | Powered Payload | <u> 1 MLE</u> | Crew time = Transfer |
|---|---------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Protein Crystal Gro | wth – Single Therm | nal Enclosure System (PCG-STES) |

| • | Passive Stowage | 4.75 MLE | Crew time = Transfer |
|---|--|--------------------------|----------------------|
| | Coarsening in Soli | d Liquid Mixture (CSLM) | 1.4 MLE |
| | Human Research | Facility (HRF) Experimen | nt Hardware 0.62 MLE |
| | Sample Coil Asser | mblies | 0.80 MLE |
| | Investigating the | Structure (In-SPACE) | |

◆ Zeolite Crystal Growth (ZCG) Samples 1.2 MLE and Support Hardware

♦ Misc. Hardware

Descent 6.60 MLE (Includes Packing Factor)

| • | Powered Payload | <u> 4 MLE</u> | Crew time = Transfer |
|---|-----------------|---------------|----------------------|
| | ◆ PCG-STES 7 | 1 MLE | |
| | ◆ CGBA | 1 MLE | |
| | ◆ PGBA | 2 MLE | |
| • | Passive Stowage | 2.0 MLE | Crew time = Transfer |
| | ◆ HRF | 0.8 MLE | |
| | ◆ ZCG | 1.2 MLE | |



11A Consumables Summary



- ISS N2 tanks status: GREEN through 11A (9A transferred tanks almost full)
 - √ N2 transfer not required on 11A
- ISS O2 tanks status: GREEN through 11A (9A transferred tanks almost full)
 - ✓ O2 transfer not required on 11A
 - ✓ Nominal O2 usage still maintains tanks with acceptable margin until transfer on 12A
 - ✓ Decision to transfer will be made real-time if consumables are available
- LiOH Supply exceeds requirement for nominal dual-bed CDRA operation
 - ✓ Assumes protection for EOM+3
 - ✓ Protects for single-bed CDRA operations and contingency cases
- Water transfer on 11A (7 CWCs) supports water demands through ULF1 arrival

Consumables present no constraints to launch and on orbit operations

INCREMENT 6 下**Q**企 11 NOV* _1 03 FEB ANET 1 MAR 10P 11A ULF1 (P1) 05 DEC (MPLM)



Expedition 6 Crew



N. Budarin



K. Bowersox Commander



D. Pettit

Increment 6

From 11A Launch November 11, 2002 (*U/R)

To ULF1 Undock **NET March 11, 2003**

Duration – 120 Days On-board ISS – 118 Days







Increment 6: Stage 11A Overview



Stage Data

11A Undock Date:ULF1 Unock Date:Duration:November 20, 2002 (*U/R)NET March 11, 2003120 days

Crew

Commander Flight Engineer 1 Flight Engineer 2

Ken Bowersox Nikolai Budarin Don Pettit

Stage Objectives

- Stow 11A cargo
- Perform U.S. and Russian Utilization
- Perform USOS EVA including P1 central radiator deploy, UHF antenna deploy, and CETA cart outfitting
 - Followed by IVA checkout of P1 TRRJ and UHF antenna
- Perform USOS software upgrades required for 12A
- Perform high priority SSRMS OCRs
- Prepare ISS and crew for Flight ULF1
 - SSRMS Checkout
 - CBCS Installation and Checkout
 - EVA preparation (airlock and tools)
 - External TV Camera Group (ETVCG) & Luminaire assembly
 - Prepack for cargo return and crew rotation



Payload Status



Active US Science Facilities

• EXPRESS #1, EXPRESS #2, EXPRESS #4, Human Research Facility (HRF) Rack (as scheduled), Microgravity Science Glovebox (MSG) Rack (as scheduled)

Ongoing Increment 5 US Payload Investigations

- NASA Code M:
 - Crew Earth Observation (CEO) and Material International Space Station Experiment (MISSE) External
- Human Life Sciences (HLS):
 - Interactions, EVA Radiation Monitor (EVARM), Pulmonary Function in Flight (PuFF), Renal Stone
- Micro-gravity Research Program Office (MRPO):
 - Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS), Microgravity Acceleration Measurement System (MAMS), Protein Crystal Growth (PCG)-STES, Pore Formation and Mobility Investigation (PFMI), and MSG Belgian Taxi Flight
- Space Product Development (SPD):
 - Plant Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (PGBA)/Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA)

Increment 5 Payloads Affecting 11A

• Return hardware and samples include: PCG-STES, PGBA, CGBA, Zeolite Crystal Growth (ZCG), HRF return, Belgian Taxi Flight Return









Increment 6 New Investigations

HLS: Foot/Ground Reaction Forces During Space Flight (FOOT)

• MRPO: InSPACE, CSLM, PCG-STES #10 (new samples delivered on 11A)

• SPD: Zeolite Crystal Growth (new samples delivered on 11A)

Increment 6 Continuing Investigations

• Code M: CEO, EARTHKAM, MISSE

• HLS: Renal Stone, PuFF

• MRPO: MAMS, SAMS, PFMI





Vehicle Office

STS-113 / 11A



Flight Readiness Review October 31, 2002





AGENDA

On-Orbit Vehicle Readiness

A. Sang



AGENDA




- On-Orbit Vehicle Readiness
 - Flight 9A Configuration
 - Hardware Status
 - 9A Status
 - Integrated GN&C Status
 - Treadmill Vibration Isolation System (TVIS)
 - Interim Resistive Exercise Device (IRED)
 - Trailing Umbilical System (TUS) Interface Umbilical System (IUA)
 - Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA)
 - Airlock Common Cabin Air Assembly (CCAA) Water Separator
 - Backup
 - On-Orbit Summary



Flight 9A Configuration







Hardware Status (New)



| Issues | New Since 9A FRR | Impact to 11A Docked Operations | Topic to be Presented |
|---|---------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| GIVUS Offline | Yes | No | Yes |
| SIGI 1 (GPS) Data Causes GNC MDM Fail to Diagnostic Mode | Yes | No | Yes |
| RGA-1 Depressurization | Yes | No | No |
| IRED Canister Anomaly | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| ACBM Contamination | Yes | No | No |
| MCA Purge Time Override Failed Error | Yes | No | No |
| SM Vosdukh Intermittent Failure | Yes | No | No |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |



Hardware Status (Ongoing)



| Issues | New Since 9A FRR | Impact to 11A Docked Operations | Topic to be Presented |
|---|---------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| CMG #1 Failure | No | No | No |
| Ammonia QD Lock-up/Spool Positioning Devices (SPD) | No | Yes | No |
| PGT Out of Cal Impacts | No | No | No |
| BGA Shoulder Bolt | No | No | No |
| A/L CCAA Water Separator | No | No | Yes |
| ITCS Coolant Quality | No | No | No |
| USOS Battery Pressures | No | No | No |
| BGA High Motor Current | No | No | No |
| RPCMs | No | No | No |
| SSRMS Camera Address Assignment | No | No | No |
| SM Kurs Intermittent Failure | No | No | No |
| | | | |
| | | | |



Integrated GN&C Status



- The primary US GN&C MDM transitioned to diagnostic on Sunday September 22nd and again on Monday September 23rd
 - Fault tree analysis indicating most likely cause of both events was isolated to an illegal output value (NaN) in data provided by one of the GPS Receivers, specifically the attitude code.
 - The GPS receivers were powered off to allow the GN&C team to perform troubleshooting.
- The Russian GIVUS went offline on Friday October 25th reducing the overall Station navigation system redundancy.
 - GPS 1 powered on in standby mode to allow use of US attitude string as primary source.
 - GIVUS was recovered later on Friday October 25^{th.}
 - Identified need to accelerate the plan to recover full US navigation system capabilities.
- Plan to patch the GN&C flight software presented to ASCB on Friday October 25^{th.}
 - Develop two patches that will allow the software to handle any NaNs as standard exceptions.
- GPS 1 and GPS 2 brought up to provide state determination redundancy on October 28th]
 - Attitude code inhibited to prevent NaNs from being generated.
- 24 hour patch process initiated on Monday October 28th
 - Patches delivered to the MBF on October 29th
 - Team review of patch Integrated Flight Load (IFL) scheduled for 15:00 CST October 29th
 - MOD plan to uplink on November 1st



9A Status



TVIS

- On STS-112/9A, the TVIS chassis R&R and activation/checkout was successful.
 - Inc 5 crew has go for operations with no loading restrictions on SLDs, but speed restrictions for two crew in place.
 - Inc 6 crew restriction pending 11A stage assessment.
- During R&R crew reported that the 3 of 4 gyro cables were damaged with one severely damaged.
 - Temporary maintenance procedure implemented.
 - Soyuz 5 to deliver one set of new gyro cables.
 - Potential for STS113/11A to bring additional set.
 - Repair to be perform during 11A Stage.

IRED Canister

- Pre-STS-112/9A decision to not return any cans on 9A.
 - 100K cycle canisters to be used first until failure or return.
 - New canisters maintenance restored canister to reduced capability
- Return 100K canisters on 11A.
- IFM to be performed on suspect canisters during 11A stage.

TUS IUA Status

- Safing bolts removed successfully, therefore R&R was not required.
- Full functionality restored. No impact to 11A operations.



9A Status



- Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) Operations
 - CDRA dual bed mode operation was nominal.
 - SDTO performed on 9A
 - Configuration: Vozdukh off, no LiOH changeout on Orbiter, and CDRA operating in dual bed mode.
 - ppCO2 maintained under 6 mm Hg for approximately 34 hours.
 - CDRA ready to support 11A.
- Airlock CCAA Water Separator R&R 9A Results: R&R was completed successfully.
 - 9A Docked phase: LTL flow reduced to 100 lbm/hour.
 - 9A Stage phase: Housekeeping mode, i.e., no LTL flow and fan off.
 - Hamilton Sunstrand investigation has begun.
 - Preliminary indication show that MetOx restrictions can be lifted.
 - Results show that the water separator was clogged due to increased number of wet/dry cycles.
 - 11A has only no constraints to operations.

NO CONSTRAINTS TO LAUNCH AND ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS



Conclusion



• ISS MER has reviewed all of the open issues (including 9A issues) and concludes that the on-orbit vehicle has no constraints to STS-113/11A launch or operations.





Loose NH3 QD Detent Button

M. Santen

M. Santen / Boeing Hou TCS

T. Bond / NASA JSC TCS



Issue



- EVA crewman reported during 9A that the S1-1 Radiator 1" Female labeled "F1" (S/N 1070) had a detent button that was partially unscrewed
 - Screw threads visible under the button head
 - It was clearly spaced radially farther than expected
 - Crewman retightened button cap by hand taking reportedly six turns
 - Approximately 10 turns to fully remove the detent button







Note: The QD shown does not have the detent locking collar installed like the one on-orbit.



QD Detent Button & Button Cap



Fully seated button cap



Button cap



Partially unseated button cap



Fully seated button cap



Detent button



Partially unseated button cap




Note: The QDs shown do not have the detent locking collar installed like on-orbit. ISS-B--13



Detent Button Cap P/N 515171-5

(Same for all QD sizes)







Detent Button / Cap Assembly Requirements Assessment



- Detent button was intended to be held in place with both thread-locking compound and torque
 - Original build paper used for S/N 1070 (and most other P1 QDs) included steps to install thread-locking compound and torque to 20 in/lbs prior to ATP
 - Tech buy with QC verify (not witness)
 - Check of flight-like 1" and ¾" QDs at Parker showed that thread-locking compound was present and the button did not freely come loose without resistance
 - 5-10 in/lbs breaking and similar running torques
 - This is sufficient to prevent loosening during launch
- Qual QD vibration tests at high levels successfully conducted without any detent button problems
 - ATP does not include vibration

Engineering intent was to require thread-lock and torque



Two Basic Issues Revealed From Investigation




- Build paper review and engineering analysis has revealed that there are two basic issues to address:
- QDs with rework may not have thread-lock
 - QDs which failed their original ATP and were reworked as part of the normal Parker build process may have been reassembled without proper threadlocking compound on the detent button cap
- Some 1.5 inch QDs may not have thread-lock
 - A portion of the 1.5 inch QDs were assembled using a discrepant version of processing paper that did not call for the use of thread-locking compound
 - This potential exists regardless of whether or not any rework was performed



QDs with rework may not have threadlock



- Belief is that S/N 1070 (problem QD from 9A) lacked thread-locking compound
 - 1070 was reworked due to an ATP failure, but traceability of rework process was lacking when this QD was built (1998)
 - Quality process flaw discovered and corrected in 2000
 - 1070 came from a build lot of 20 QDs 2 others on P1 but neither was reworked
- Team believes QD rework may = no thread-lock
- Other QDs on P1 with rework in their history:
 - Five suspect QDs Four ¾" QDs on RBVM and Rads, and one ¼" QD on DDCU coldplate
 - All of these QDs are contained in MLI booties that can offer some degree of containment of a loose detent button
- None of the uncovered P1 QDs experienced any form of rework



All reworked QDs on P1 are currently inside booties



Some 1.5 inch QDs may not have thread-lock




- Further review revealed that two versions of build op sheets on 1.5" size coexisted during the majority of flight QD builds
 - One version did not reference installing thread-locking compound at all
- Isolated to group of 14 QDs on S0/S1/P1 (PMA and Seg-Seg jumpers)
 - TRRJ and FHRC are not affected
- Of those 14, three on P1 PMA do not have booties
 - Mitigating Data
 - 8 x 1.5" Seg to Seg Jumper QDs launched on S0 had same omission in build paper, four of which were operated on 9A. No button problems encountered.
 - 3 x 1.5" S1 PMA QDs likely have same omission in build paper and were operated on 9A. No button problems encountered.
 - 2 x 1.5" Non-Nedox Qual QDs had same omission in build paper and passed delta qual random vibration testing to much higher levels than are seen in orbiter. No button problems encountered.
 - 3 x 1.5" Identical TTA PM QDs had same omission in build paper but were found to actually contain thread-locking compound and sufficient running torque

Low likelihood that 1.5" QD detent buttons will come loose



Location of PM in Payload Bay







Rationale For Flight



- Close this concern for 11A as an acceptable risk
 - Even with one instance of a partially unscrewed button on 9A, ground and flight experience shows no other detent button caps have unscrewed and none fully detached
 - Ground test showed sufficient breakaway and running torque with thread-lock
 - Multiple processing opportunities to notice loose detent buttons
 - Damage to Orbiter or Station hardware is unlikely if the detent button cap fully unscrews
 - Button mass is 0.0088 lb (0.14 oz) vs 0.25 lb (28:1) limit imposed by SSP 30558 for non-hazardous released parts (ISS) or fracture critical hazard controls by NASA-STD-5003 (Shuttle)
 - Uncovered QDs are located inside the P1 truss which is covered by exterior MLI
 - Low likelihood that loose detent button could reach and jam payload bay mechanisms
 - All suspect reworked QDs have booties/MLI covers
 - Low likelihood that 1.5" QD detent buttons will come loose
- Modify flight procedures to check for tight button cap as first step when EVA crewman visits a QD worksite
 - Any QD that cannot be operated on 11A due to missing detent button can be revisited on a later flight









Flight 11A/STS-113 Flight Readiness Review October 31, 2002



ISS 11A Program Reviews



Launch Package Assessment (LPA) – September 10, 2002

- Addressed the launch package readiness for integration into the Orbiter.
- Successfully completed and authorized to proceed with payload processing.

Stage Operations Readiness Review – October 17, 2002

- Addressed CoFR requirements for cargo elements, middeck stowed hardware, launch package, personnel, facilities, operations and their readiness to proceed to launch 11A on 11/11/02.
- Authorized to proceed to launch 11A.
- No open waivers or exceptions.
- All flight 11A applicable actions are closed.







- Manifest hardware R-notes (approximately 22 items) mostly reflown hardware – ECD 11/06/02
- All open paper is closed except for pending standard forward work
 - ◆ Late load payloads



ISS Program Summary



- MER has verified all ISS Launch Commit Criteria are GO
- Flight objectives and priorities are identified
- Flight manifest and processing schedule supports launch date
- All hardware and software certifications are complete or will be complete prior to launch – standard forward work
- Mission Integration Documentation Complete
 - ◆ IDRD, MIP, ICDs, JTWG endorsements and CAD models
- Personnel and facilities are ready to support the mission
- None of the standard forward work represents a constraint to the flight 11A launch

The ISS Program is ready to proceed with the launch of ISS 11A/STS-113





BACK-UP



Current On-Orbit Status



• C&DH

- All Station MDMs operational
 - Node N1-2 primary, N1-1 secondary
 - Lab
 - C&C 1 standby, C&C 2 backup, C&C 3 primary
 - INT systems 1 off, INT systems 2 operating
 - LA MDMs: LA-1, LA-2, & LA-3 operating
 - Power Management Controller Unit (PMCU) 1 off, PMCU 2 operating
 - GNC 1 backup, GNC 2 primary
 - Payload MDMs: PL 1 off, PL 2 primary
 - Airlock MDM operating
 - Photovoltaic Control Unit (PVCU) MDM 2B backup, 4B primary
 - EXT 1 off, EXT 2 operating
 - S0 MDM: S0-1- operating; S0-2 operating
 - S1 MDM: S1-1, S1-2, and STR operating
 - FGB 1 operating, FGB 2 off
 - SM Loaded with version 5.0 software
 - SMCCs all in redundant set, SMCC-3 primary
 - SMTCs all in redundant set





C&T

- S-band high/low data rate operating nominally
 - Fully redundant
- Ku band operating nominally
- MCOR operational on 2 channels.
- HCOR on board. Installation schedule post 11A.
- External TV Camera Group (ETVCG) on Lab and S1 are operational.
- Audio system
 - Internal Audio Controller: IAC-2 active, IAC-1 off
 - Have occasional P-bits on audio equipment. No impact.
- SM Regul System 2 of 3 strings operational
- SM Kurs set #2 has intermittent failures no impact





• ECLS

- Lab ECLS systems operating as required
 - CDRA operational in dual bed mode.
 - MCA operational.
- Node smoke detector #2 operational, but off due to dirty indication -
 - Still awaiting on-orbit troubleshooting
 - Cleaning procedure in work.
- Airlock CCAA water separator R&R'd but 9A stage restrictions in place.
 - No constraint for 11A EVA operations.
- Vacuum System Pirani gauges do not provide output below 7.5 to 9 millitorr.
 - 11A stage payload requires operational vacuum system.
 - ASCB to approve PPLs to adjust calibration curves and limits
- SM Vozdukh operating on 2 of 3 CO2 removal beds
 - CO2 removal capability nominal
 - Vozdukh has experience intermittent failures.
- SM Air conditioners (SKV) #1 operational, #2 degraded (latent heat removal)
- SM Elektron: Operational.
- SM rapid depress response nominal.

NO CONSTRAINTS TO LAUNCH AND ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS





• EPS

- FGB EPS working nominally
 - 5 of 6 batteries on-line
- SM EPS working nominally
 - All 8 batteries on-line
- P6 power channels 2B and 4B operating nominally
 - 2B and 4B rotated as required for power
 - Dual angle mode and XPOP flown when possible
- S1 12 RPCMs operational
- RPCMs
 - RPCMs LAD22B-A, LAFWD-1B-A, LAFWD-1B-C, and LAD62B-A have bit flips on SRAM and cannot be refreshed
 - No short term impact
 - · Spares available, if required
 - Overall R&R plan being implemented to return suspect RPCMs to the ground
 - P6 Battery 4B21 vs 4B22 Average Pressure Delta: ~ 7232 mmHg (~ 143 PSI)

NO CONSTRAINTS TO LAUNCH AND ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS





- EV&CS/GFE hardware
 - VOA (air sample analyzer) sporadically operational
 - 3-4 month system validation process in work
 - Hard drive with new software load delivered on 9A
 - TOCA (water sample analyzer) degraded
 - TEPC (radiation monitor) nominal
 - Defibrillator Operational
 - IRED Operational. 100K canisters will be swapped on 11A.
 - CEVIS Operational.
 - TVIS chassis R&R completed, nominal operations
 - Gyro cables
 - IV-CPDS experiences occasional downlink of data problems
 - EV-CPDS Operating
 - Water Maintenance Kit (WMK) kits useable





• EVR

- SSRMS fully operational on both strings.
- MT nominal for planned operations.
- RWS operational
- GN&C
 - CMG #1 failed
 - All remaining CMGs have experienced occasional loss of comm
 - GPS system deactivated due to NaN data sending GNC MDM to diagnostic mode.
 - Workaround in place.
 - Operating in post-5A/pre-8A configuration.
 - Russian attitude data is prime.
 - US attitude determination backup.
- Propulsion systems
 - Nominal.





• S&M

- 2B and 4B BGA showing high currents sporadically
 - 2B and 4B rotated as required for power
 - Dual angle mode and XPOP flown when possible
 - Low b X-POP being pursued to limit BGA rotations, when possible.
- Impact mark on SM window #7
- 3 of 4 Beta Gimbal Assembly (BGA) latching mechanisms locked on starboard 4 Bar assembly
 - Latched port 4 Bar assembly on 5A.1
 - Strength analysis shows 3 of 4 acceptable for life.
- S1 truss segment integrated with S0
- CETA cart capability





- TCS
 - Early external active thermal control system (EEATCS)operating within specs
 - Starboard radiator has one loop plumbed incorrectly
 - Heat rejection capability impacted still meets current heat rejection needs
 - External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS): All necessary umbilicals connected and integrity verified and being trended -- Loop A is filled with Nitrogen pad
 - S0-to-S1 Fluid jumpers installed
 - ATA-to-PM umbilicals connected
 - NTA-to-ATA umbilicals connected
 - Loop A Pressures steady (trending will be ongoing until 12A.1)
 - SPDs installed on 33 QDs (RBVMs, S1-to-S0 jumpers, ATA-to-PM, PM, and TRRJ Stinger); 4 of which are on wet QDs.
 - ORU Checkouts for PM, ATA, NTA and RBVMs successful
 - TRRJ Checkout completed
 - Rotated to +113.7 and -114.9 degrees
 - S1-2 Radiator deployed
 - ITCS operating nominally
 - ITCS fine filter R&R plan established.
 - Comprehensive ITCS fluid forward plan still in work

NO CONSTRAINTS TO LAUNCH AND ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS